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DLLHijackHunter

Automated DLL hijacking discovery, validation and confirmation for Windows. From "this DLL might be hijackable" to "a standard user can make SYSTEM load this, and here is the proof."

Selected for Arsenal at SecTor, Toronto and Europe, London, 2026
Language
C# on .NET 8 or 10
Licence
MIT
Platform
Windows
Latest release
v2.6.0
GitHub stars
415
Reports
Console, JSON, HTML

Quick start

Download DLLHijackHunter.exe from the latest release. It is self-contained, so no .NET install is needed. Then, from an elevated prompt:

Passive, read-only triage: no file drops, no service or task starts

.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile safe

Full static analysis without touching the system, JSON report

.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile aggressive --no-canary --no-etw -o report.json

Everything, including ETW and canary confirmation. Lab or authorised targets only

.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --profile aggressive -o report.html

Focus on one application

.\DLLHijackHunter.exe --target "C:\Program Files\MyApp\app.exe" --no-canary

The canary and probe DLLs are unsigned and behave like hijack payloads, so Microsoft Defender may quarantine them. The tool notices and reports those results as inconclusive, not as "not hijackable".

How it works

Every judgement is made from the attacker's point of view, an unprivileged standard user, even when the scanner itself runs elevated. Running as Administrator lets it see more; it never makes a protected directory look writable.

  1. Discovery

    Finds every place a binary launches on its own (services, scheduled tasks, Run keys, Startup folders, COM servers, auto-elevating EXEs) and works out where each DLL it imports would be searched for.

  2. Filter pipeline

    Hard gates drop the positions a standard-user attacker can't use: API sets, KnownDLLs, directories they can't write. Soft gates adjust confidence and record why.

  3. Verification

    Optional. The load probe asks the real Windows loader which copy wins; the canary plants a harmless DLL, triggers the service, task or COM object, and records the identity it actually ran as.

    A fired canary is the only thing that can say Confirmed.

  4. Output

    Scores and tiers from Confirmed to Informational, attack chains such as standard user to SYSTEM, and a console, JSON or HTML report.

What it finds

Phantom
The DLL does not exist anywhere in the search path, so it can be planted anywhere the binary searches.
Search order
A writable directory is searched before the legitimate copy, including overwriting a DLL in a writable directory.
ENV PATH
A writable directory in PATH is searched for a missing DLL. Services are checked against the machine PATH only.
.local redirect
An app.exe.local folder redirects the load. Reported only for executables without a manifest, or when IFEO DevOverrideEnable is set.
Side-load (UAC)
An auto-elevating EXE copied next to a planted DLL. Only for EXEs whose manifest sets autoElevate.
AppInit DLLs
AppInit_DLLs points to a writable DLL, loaded into every process that loads user32.dll.
AppCert DLLs
AppCertDLLs points to a writable DLL, loaded into every CreateProcess or WinExec caller.

Confidence tiers

Each finding gets a confidence and an impact score, combined into a final score out of 10. Findings are also linked into attack chains, such as a standard user reaching SYSTEM.

Confirmed
The canary fired.
High
80% or more, and a proof signal: a load-probe win, an ETW observation, or a HijackLibs match.
Medium
50% or more. Unverified static findings are capped here and marked Static-only.
Low
20% or more.
Informational
Below 20%, but above the profile's minimum confidence.

Profiles

ProfileForCanaryETWMinimum confidence
aggressivedefaultFull audit, labs.YesYes15%
strictHigh-confidence escalation only.YesYes80%
safeProduction, read-only.NoNo50%
redteamConfirmed escalation only.YesYes50%
uac-bypassAuto-elevation vectors.NoNo20%

Safety

Use DLLHijackHunter only on systems you own or are explicitly authorised to assess.

  • --profile safe (or --no-canary --no-etw) is read-only, and suitable for production triage.
  • ETW mode starts services and runs scheduled tasks to provoke DLL loads, even without the canary.
  • Canary mode replaces DLLs with backup and restore, stops and restarts services, runs tasks and activates COM objects. Fragile services can misbehave while a proxy canary is loaded.
  • Unsigned canary and probe DLLs may be quarantined by antivirus. Those results are reported as inconclusive, never as not vulnerable.

Known limitations

  • Static search order is an approximation. Runtime behaviour is inferred from imports; the canary is the proof.
  • ETW sees only the processes and loads that happen during the trace window (120 seconds by default).
  • Persistence is worked out from auto-start configuration, not from a reboot test.
  • Run key, Startup and UAC side-load findings cannot be canary-confirmed automatically.
  • Canary and probe DLLs are unsigned and may be blocked by antivirus or application-control policy.

Every flag, the exit codes, the report format and the HijackRange test lab are in the docs.